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The Constitutionality of the North Carolina
Control Share Acquisition Act
In 1987, with the move of RJR Nabisco's headquarters out of North Carolina,' USAir's purchase of Winston-Salem-based Piedmont Airlines, 2 and the
attempted takeover of Greensboro-based Burlington Industries,3 North Carolina
began to feel the effects of what has been labeled the "fourth major merger wave
since the turn of the century." '4 The environment of hostile takeovers and corporate mergers has prompted statutory responses both at the federal and state

level. In 1968, for example, in an effort to regulate corporate takeovers and to
ensure fundamental fairness to the parties involved, Congress enacted the Wil-

liams Act.5 States also responded to the increase in takeovers by enacting state
takeover statutes. 6 Partly in response to the 1987 attempted takeover of Bur1. Raleigh News & Observer, Apr. 29, 1987, at IA, col. 1.
2. Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1987, at 14, col. 5.
3. Raleigh News & Observer, Apr. 29, 1987, at 1A, col. 1.
4. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, FEDERAL INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF HOSTILE
TAKEOVERS AND OTHER CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1985). Merger, used herein as a nontechnical term, means any acquisition or takeover of one corporation by another corporation or other person. Id. at 2 n.2.
5. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)). The Williams Act added §§ 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Section 13(d) focuses on open market and privately negotiated acquisitions of securities subject
to the 1934 Act. Section 13(d) requires owners of five percent or more of any class of securities
subject to the 1934 Act to file a schedule 13D with the SEC within 10 business days after reaching
the five percent threshold. The schedule must contain information including the offeror's background and identity; the extent of the offeror's ownership in the company; financing arrangements
for the acquisition; and if the offeror intends to take control of the target company, any future plans
for the target such as liquidation, sale of assets, merger, or any change in the company's business. 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 to -101 (1987).
Section 14(d) focuses on "tender offers" for securities subject to the 1934 Act. In addition to
the 13(d) filing, § 14(d) requires that an offeror who acquires more than five percent of any class of
securities through a tender offer must file a statement similar to that required under § 13(d). Additional information must be provided, including disclosure of any past transactions with the target
company, any antitrust or other legal conflicts relating to the tender offer, and other material information about the offeror. The offeror must provide relevant information disclosed under § 14(d) to
shareholders of the target company. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (incorporating § 78m(d)(1) by reference);
17 C.F.R. §§ 140.14d-3 to -100 (1987).
In addition to filing and disclosure requirements, the Williams Act contains provisions intended
to protect shareholders of the target company. First, a tender offer must remain open for at least 20
business days. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1987). Second, tendering shareholders can withdraw their
shares during the period the offer remains open. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)
(1987). Third, if the shares tendered within 10 days outnumber the offer, the offeror must purchase
those shares on a pro rata basis from each tendering shareholder. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14(d)(8) (1987). Fourth, if the offeror increases the offer price before the expiration of the offer,
the offeror must pay the higher price to all tendering shareholders. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7). Fifth,
§ 14(e) contains an antifraud provision that prohibits fraud, deceit, and material misrepresentation,
or omission by the offeror, target company, or any other person. Id. § 78n(e); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1
to -3 (1987); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S.Ct. 1637, 1644 (1987); T. HAZEN, THE
LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §§ 11.10-.15 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
6. For example, North Carolina in 1977 enacted its first takeover statute, the Tender Offer
Disclosure Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78B-1 to -11 (1985); see Comment, The North CarolinaTender
Offer DisclosureAct: CongenitallyDefective?, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1035 (1978); Note, Securities Regulation: The Validity of North Carolina's Tender Offer DisclosureAct, 19 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 267 (1983).
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lington Industries, a Delaware corporation based in Greensboro, North Carolina, the North Carolina General Assembly passed two takeover statutes:7 the
North Carolina Control Share Acquisition Act s and the North Carolina Shareholder Protection Act 9. If valid, these statutes will increase the difficulty of accomplishing hostile takeovers of North Carolina-based corporations.

This Note describes the scope and effect of the North Carolina Control
Share Acquisition Act and analyzes the impact of the recent United States

Supreme Court decision in CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 10 which upheld
the constitutionality of a comparable Indiana statute. It analyzes the constitu-

tionality of the North Carolina Act and calls attention to two provisions of the
Act: the friendly offer provision, which exempts management-approved acquisi-

tions from the Act, and the Act's extraterritorial feature, which applies to certain foreign corporations doing business in North Carolina. In light of the CTS
decision, this Note concludes that these two provisions are unconstitutional violations of the Williams Act and the commerce clause of the United States Con-

stitution. The Note recommends solutions to the constitutional problems raised
by these two provisions. 11
The North Carolina Control Share Acquisition Act is a takeover statute
based on a voting rights model: it does not directly prohibit the purchase of
shares, but it gives shareholders the ability to deny voting rights of certain shares
purchased by investors.1 2 The Act also includes a share redemption feature that
allows shareholders to redeem their shares at a fair value if an investor obtains a
13
majority of voting power in corporate stock.
As defined in the North Carolina Control Share Acquisition Act, an investor makes a "control share acquisition" whenever he purchases shares of an
7. See Hazen, CorporateDirectors'Accountabiliy: The Race to the Bottom-The Second Lap,
66 N.C.L. REv. 171, 180 (1987); Raleigh News & Observer, Sept. 18, 1987, at IA, col. 5 (Burlington
reported paying at least $200,000 to North Carolina lobbyists to promote takeover legislation). One
commentator noted:
The only groups who are active in the enactment of second generation takeover statutes are
business organizations and the bar. The statutes proceed through state legislatures at an
extraordinarily rapid pace, with virtually unanimous bipartisan support, at the behest of
the local business community and, most frequently, one concerned firm. This data supports what I term a putting-out-fires explanation of the enactment of takeover legislation,
in which legislators simply react to a constituent's immediate concrete demands.
Romano, The State Competition Debate In CorporateLaw, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 709, 727 (1987).
8. North Carolina Control Share Acquisition Act, ch. 182, 1987 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 48
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-90 to -98 (Cum. Supp. 1987)), ch. 773, § 12, 1987 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 426 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-98.1 (Cum. Supp. 1987)).
9. North Carolina Shareholder Protection Act, ch. 88, 1987 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 70 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-75 to -79 (Cum. Supp. 1987)), ch. 124, 1987 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. I
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-75, -79.1, -80 (Cum. Supp. 1987)). This Note focuses only on the North Carolina Control Share Acquisition Act. For a discussion of the North
Carolina Shareholder Protection Act, see Note, The North CarolinaShareholderProtectionAct, 66
N.C.L. REv. 1146 (1988).
10. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
11. This Note does not attempt to discuss the economic aspects of the statute.
12. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-94 (Cum. Supp. 1987); infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text;
Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Commerce Clause andState CorporateLaw, 41 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 473, 481-83 (1987).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-95 (Cum. Supp. 1987); see infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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issuing corporation that would entitle him to voting power equal to or greater
14
than one-fifth, one-third, or one-half of all voting power in the corporation.
The high threshold voting percentages ensure that the Act is triggered only
when an investor acquires enough stock to enable him to effectuate a change in
corporate control. Because a control share acquisition is defined solely in terms
of the voting power that would be attributed to the control shares, the Act applies to virtually every type of stock purchase including tender offers, open market purchases, and privately negotiated purchases.15
The Act applies to both in-state and out-of-state "issuing public corporations," which are defined as meeting four statutory criteria:
"Issuing public corporation" means a corporation that:
a. Is incorporated under the laws of:
(i) North Carolina and has substantial assets within North
Carolina; or
(ii) Any other state of the United States, and:
(A) As of the end of each of its two most recent fiscal
years and most recent fiscal quarter has more than
forty percent (40%) of its fixed assets that are located in the United States located within North Carolina; and
(B) More than forty percent (40%) of the persons employed by such corporation in the United States are
residents of North Carolina;
b. Has 500 or more shareholders,
c. Has its principal place of business or principal office within
North Carolina, and
d. Has either:
(i) More than ten percent (10%) of its shareholders resident
in North Carolina; or
(ii) More than ten percent (10%) of its shares owned by North
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90(b)(2), (b)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1987). For example, assume an investor owns no stock in North Carolina corporation X and he purchases 15% of corporation X's outstanding shares. The North Carolina Control Share Acquisition Act is not applicable to this
purchase because no threshold has been broken. If the investor then purchases an additional 10% of
stock, that purchase would bring his ownership total to 25%, breaking the one-fifth (20%) threshold
set by the Act. The purchase of the additional 10% of stock is considered a control share acquisition
and only that 10% stock is subject to the Act. Next assume the investor adds 5% to his existing
25% stock ownership. The 30% total does not break the next threshold of one-third (33%) and,
therefore, the 5% purchase is not subject to the Act. If the investor's last purchase is 25%, his total
ownership of 55% breaks the one-half (50%) threshold, thereby subjecting the last 25% purchase to
the Act. Compare North Carolina Act's high threshold requirements for tender offers to the lower
5% threshold requirement of the Williams Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1).
15. The Williams Act applies to the same type of stock purchases. See supra note 5. A tender
offer is defined in the North Carolina Tender Offer Disclosure Act as:
[A]n offer to purchase or invitation to tender,... made by an offeror, directly or indirectly,
for such amount of any class of equity securities of a ... company that, together with
equity securities of such class owned beneficially or of record by the offeror and his associates at the time of the offer or invitation, will in the aggregate exceed five percent (5%) of
the outstanding equity securities of such class.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78B-2(14) (1985).
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Carolina residents. 16
An issuing public corporation, whether domestic or foreign, by definition has a
significant local business presence in the State and a substantial number of shareholders, some of whom are North Carolina residents. A significant and controversial aspect of the Act is its extraterritorial application to foreign
corporations. 17
Corporations otherwise covered by the Act can be exempted pursuant to
two provisions. The first exemption allows a corporation's board of directors
voluntarily to opt out of the Act. 18 The board of directors of "any corporation"
existing on the effective date of the exemption section had ninety days to adopt
bylaws that would opt the corporation out of the Act. 19 A corporation formed
after the date of this exemption section is exempt if so stated in its initial articles
20
of incorporation.
The second exemption provision is a comity provision that only applies to
foreign corporations. 21 A foreign corporation otherwise covered by the Act is
automatically exempt when it would be subjected to inconsistent regulation. 22
This exemption provision attempts to reduce the risk of conflict between the law
of two states whenever the foreign corporation's state of incorporation has a
23
takeover law conflicting with the North Carolina Act.
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90(b)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1987). Compare the scope of the North Carolina Act to the Williams Act, which applies to companies listed on a national exchange or which
have 500 shareholders and over $5 million in assets. 15 U.S.C. 781(a), (g)(1) (1982); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12g-1 (1987) (increasing asset requirement from $1 million to $5 million).
17. For a discussion of this extraterritorial feature of the Control Share Acquisition Act, see
infra notes 128-71 and accompanying text. The other North Carolina takeover statute enacted in
1987, the Shareholder Protection Act, has a similar extraterritorial application. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-75(b)(3a) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-98.1 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
19. Id. The exemption section was ratified three months after the rest of the Act. The 90-day
opt out period ended on November 10, 1987. By using the phrase "any corporation," this section
presumably applies to both domestic and foreign corporations covered by the Act.
20. Id. (This condition applies to any corporation formed after August 12, 1987). The first
exemption section does not contain a provision either prohibiting or allowing a corporation's rela.
tionship to the Act to be altered once the board of directors makes its initial decision either to be
covered by the Act or to opt out. However, it appears that a corporation initially opting out of the
Act could opt back in by reincorporating and changing its articles of incorporation; similarly, a
corporation that had not opted out could do so by reincorporating. If the intent of the North Carolina General Assembly was to allow a corporation only one chance either to opt out or to be covered
by the Act, the language of the Act fails to promote this intent.
21. "In general, the principle of'comity' is that courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect
to laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but out of
deference and mutual respect." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 242 (5th ed. 1979).
22. According to the statute,
If any jurisdiction under the laws of which a foreign corporation is organized adopts any
law containing provisions that are expressly inconsistent with the provisions of this Article
as applicable to such foreign corporation, the provisions of this Article shall be inapplicable
to such foreign corporation to the extent necessary to resolve such inconsistency.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-96 (Cum. Supp. 1987). The requirement that another state's statute be "expressly inconsistent" raises the issue whether the absence of a conflicting law in the incorporating
state due to the state's refusal to pass control share legislation could be seen as the incorporating
state's expression that it does not believe its corporations should be subjected to such a takeover
statute. If a state believes this, does the North Carolina Act require that state to pass a law expressing this belief before it becomes "expressly inconsistent" with the North Carolina Act?
23. See Sargent, On The Validity ofState Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and
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When an investor makes a control share acquisition of corporate stock, the
Act is designed to protect existing shareholders in two ways from the coercion
that can accompany a change in the control of a corporation through stock ownership. 24 First, disinterested shareholders, as a group, have the power to decide
whether voting rights will be accorded to control shares. 25 Voting rights do not
accompany control shares unless a resolution to accord voting rights is "adopted
by the affirmative vote of the holders of at least a majority of all the outstanding
[disinterested] shares of the corporation."'26 The Act separates the transfer of
the voting rights of a control share from the transfer of the share itself.
Although the North Carolina Act does not prohibit the purchase of control
shares, its effect is to condition acquisition of control of a corporation through
the purchase of stock on approval of a majority of disinterested shareholders. 27
Before shareholders determine the voting rights of control shares, they
must be provided both with notice and information about the control share acquisition. The notice must include: (1) a copy of the investor's "acquiring person statement" setting forth information about the purchase, 28 (2) a statement
by the corporation's board of directors of its position or recommendation on
Kidwell, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 689, 726-27 (1981); see also Boehm, State Interests and Interstate Commerce: A Look at the Theoretical Underpinningsof Takeover Legislation, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
733, 754 (1979) ("If there is a conflict between the takeover law of the state of incorporation and that
of any other state, both the commerce clause and full faith and credit seem to dictate that the law of
the state of incorporation should control.").
24. See CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1646 (citing Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing and Non-Tender Offer
Purchase Programs,Exchange Act Release No. 21,079 [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 83,637, at 86,916 (June 21, 1984)) (shareholders feel pressure to tender because if they do
not and the offer is successful, nontendering shareholders assuredly will be forced to sell at a lower
price, second step once offeror gains control); Lowenstein, PruningDeadwood in Hostile Takeovers
A Proposalfor Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. RyV. 249, 307-09 (1983) (same).
25. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-94 (Cum. Supp. 1987). The right to decide the voting rights of
control shares is not granted to anyone owning "interested shares." Id. § 55-94(b). An owner of
interested shares is "[a]ny person who has acquired or proposes to acquire control shares[,]... [a]ny
officer of the issuing public corporation[,] [or]
[a]ny employee of the issuing public corporation who
is also a director of the corporation." Id. § 55-90(b)(4)(a)-(c). This prohibition preserves the balance
of power between management and offeror by not allowing either side to vote their own interests at
the shareholder meeting. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-94(a), (b)(Cum. Supp. 1987). One criticism of basing control share
voting rights on majority shareholder approval is that not all shareholders necessarily are protected.
If 51% of disinterested shareholders deny voting rights to control shares and thereby halt a tender
offer, the 49% minority who wanted to tender shares, probably at a premium, are denied that right.
See CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1654 (White, J.,
dissenting).
At each threshold, a new shareholder vote to determine voting rights of the newly acquired
shares would be required. The voting rights previously accorded or denied control shares at lower
threshold levels are not affected by a subsequent vote at a higher threshold level. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-94 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
27. See CMS, 107 S.Ct. at 1641 (referring to identical provision in Indiana Control Share Acquisitions Chapter, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9(b) (Bums Supp. 1987)).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-91 (Cum. Supp. 1987). The acquiring person statement must set
forth the investor's identity, a provision that the statement is given pursuant to the Act, the number
of shares of the issuing public corporation owned by investor, and the level of voting power that
would accrue with the purchase of the shares. If an offer to make a control share acquisition has
been made, as opposed to a completed control share purchase, the statement must also include terms
of the acquisition and representations that acquisition will not be contrary to law and that the offeror
has the financial capacity to make the acquisition. Id. These requirements are similar to those of the
Williams Act. See supra note 5.
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granting voting rights to the control shares,29 and (3) a statement describing

shareholder redemption rights if such rights exist.30 The notice provision protects shareholders by providing them with information to make an informed

decision while maintaining the balance of power between management and ac31
quiror by giving each party a chance to state its position.
The second protection afforded shareholders under the Act is a right of

redemption provision. If the holders of control shares obtain a majority of all
voting power, shareholders can require the issuing corporation to redeem shares
at a fair value. 32 "Fair value" is measured as of the day prior to the date on
which the shareholder vote accorded voting rights to control shares, but it is "a
value not less-than the highest price paid per share by the acquiring person in
the control share acquisition."'33 The fair value measurement ensures that shareholders who exercise their redemption rights are not forced to sell at a price
lower than the highest price paid by the acquiror, as is often the case in a tender
34
offer.
If many shareholders exercise their redemption right, a control share acquisition can be expensive and burdensome to the corporation and, consequently to
holders of control shares.3 5 An investor contemplating ownership of a majority
of shares might be deterred if shareholders holding a large number of shares
reserve the right to redeem shares and the corporation does not have the financial strength to redeem shares at the highest price offered by the investor. Inasmuch as the redemption provision makes a control share acquistion more costly,
it acts as a deterrent to the acquisition of a majority of shares and thus aids
36
existing management in repelling unwanted control share acquisitions.
Two other aspects of the redemption provision are worth noting. First, the
redemption section applies when "holders of the control shares have a majority
of all voting power. . .. -37 By referring to "holders" in the plural, the statute
implies that the redemption provision can be triggered when no single investor
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-93(2) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
30. Id. § 55-93(3); see infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
31. See CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1646; Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (invalidating
corporate antitakeover statute that, inter alia, allows management to communicate to shareholders
without giving offeror chance to communicate); infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-95(a), (b), (d) (Cum. Supp. 1987). Redemption rights are triggered

if four criteria are met: (1) control shares are accorded voting rights; (2) holders of control shares
have a majority of all voting power; (3) the shareholder, prior to or at a shareholder meeting to
accord voting rights, provides written notice that he may exercise his right of redemption; and (4)
the shareholder exercises his redemption right by written demand within 30 days after receipt of
notice that the redemption right exists. Id. When holders of control shares have less than a majority
of voting power, no redemption rights exist under the Act. See id. § 55-95(a).
33. Id. § 55-95(a), (e); cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-113 (1982) (fair value for dissenters' rights
under North Carolina Business Corporation Act does not have to meet the stricter "highest price
paid" standard).
34. See supra note 24.
35. The closer the acquisition approaches 100% of outstanding shares, the less of a problem
this becomes.
36. See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text (discussing benefit of redemption provision to
management); infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text (discussing burden to acquiror).
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-95(a) (Cum. Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
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has a majority of voting power. 38 For example, redemption' rights would accrue
if three separate investors each own control shares equalling twenty percent of
the voting power (each owns less than a majority). The three would be "holders" and their shares would be aggregated. Their control share total, as a group,
would be a sixty percent majority and shareholders could exercise their redemption rights.

Second, the redemption provision applies to all shareholders "other than
holders of control shares ....-39 Therefore, two of the three groups defined as
interested shareholders4°-officers of the issuing corporation owning shares, and
employees who are also directors and own shares-can exercise redemption
rights as long as they do not own control shares. Although interested shareholders cannot participate in granting voting rights to control shares, 4 1 some interested shareholders can utilize the redemption provision.
The process established by the North Carolina Act designed to protect
shareholders in a control share acquisition is to the detriment of the acquiror of
control shares. Voting rights do not automatically accompany control shares,42
and the right of redemption provision can make a control share acquisition economically unattractive.4 3 The Act also imposes certain disclosure and waiting
requirements on the acquiror before voting rights can be determined by
shareholders.

When a person makes or offers to make a control share acquisition, 44 he
must deliver an "acquiring person statement" to the issuing public corporation

before shareholders determine the voting rights of the control shares. 45 Voting
46
rights are then determined at the next annual or special shareholder meeting.

However, on delivery of the acquiring person statement, the investor can require
the issuing corporation to call a special meeting of shareholders within fifty days
to determine the voting rights of the control shares so long as the investor pays
38. The Act again refers to the plural, "persons," when it requires the corporation to provide
notice of shareholder redemption rights after "control shares held by persons having a majority of all
voting power... have been accorded voting rights. .. ." Id. § 55-95(c) (emphasis added).
39. Id. § 55-95(a).
40. See id. § 55-90(b)(4) (defining interested shareholders); supra note 25.
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-94(b) (Cum. Supp. 1987); see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-94(a) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
43. See id. § 55-95 (Cune. Supp. 1987); supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
44. "[S]hares acquired within any consecutive 90-day period or shares acquired pursuant to a
plan to make a control share acquisition are considered to have been acquired in the same acquisition." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90(b)(3)(f) (Cum. Supp. 1987). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
voting rights of shares previously owned by an investor are not affected by this Act.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-91 (Cum. Supp. 1987). Section 55-91 states that the acquiring person "may at the person's election deliver an acquiring person statement to the issuing ...corporation. . . ." Although this provision grants discretion to the acquiror, if the acquiror wants
shareholders to determine the voting rights of his control shares, he must deliver the statement to
meet the requirements of other sections of the Act. See e.g., id. § 55-93(1) (requiring acquiring
person statement to be sent to shareholders before shareholder meeting to determine voting rights);
see also supra note 28 (explaining elements of acquiring person statement).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-92(c) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
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the costs of that meeting.4 7
The fundamental reason an investor makes a control share acquistion is to
secure the voting rights of those shares. 48 If an investor makes a control share
acquisition and the control shares are not accorded voting rights, the only options are to hold the nonvoting shares or immediately resell them. Either of
these options is unattractive and costly to an investor. Therefore, unless an acquiror of control shares has great confidence that the shares will be accorded
voting rights, a more prudent approach would be to make a conditional offer to
49
purchase the control shares, conditioned on the shares receiving voting rights.
Without the confidence of shareholder approval, the Act effectively forces an
investor to make a conditional tender offer for corporate control and deters him
from making an open market purchase of control shares before voting rights are
decided.
Although the Act is designed to protect shareholders from the coercive nature of control share acquisitions, there is evidence that the impetus for the takeover legislation was to protect incumbent management from hostile
acquisitions.50 Whenever a substantial change in corporate control via stock
ownership occurs, existing management faces the risk of being ousted. Any provision of the North Carolina statute that hinders a takeover attempt, in the name
of shareholder protection, protects incumbent management as well. 5 1 The Act
potentially delays, deters, or prevents control share acquisitions by conditioning
voting rights of control shares on majority shareholder approval,5 2 by allowing
management to delay fifty days before holding a shareholder meeting to determine voting rights,5 3 and by forcing the corporation to redeem shares at a "fair
54
value" if a majority of control shares are accorded voting rights.
The Act's "friendly offer" exemption also protects incumbent management
by exempting a control share acquisition from the Act if management is a party
to the agreement.55 This exemption directly benefits incumbent management
47. Id. § 55-92(a)-(b). See infra note 86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 50-day
requirement as it relates to the Williams Act.
The acquiring person can also require that the special meeting not be held sooner than 30 days

after the request. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-92(d) (Cum. Supp. 1987). This ensures that the acquiror
can comply with the Williams Act requirement that a tender offer be held open for at least 20
business days, if the control share acquisition falls under the scope of the Williams Act. See 17 CFR
§ 240.14e-1 (1987); supra note 5.
48. See Pinto, supra note 12, at 486.
49. See CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1647; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-91 (Cum. Supp. 1987) (Act applies to
bona fide written offers).
50. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
51. See Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. Ras. L. REV. 722, 725 (1970); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 629,
637-38 & nn.12-13 (1982) (showing various defensive measures management can take to hinder a
takeover between time of offer and consummation of takeover).
52. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-94 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
53. See id. § 55-92(b).
54. See id. § 55-95.
55. Id. § 55-90(b)(3)(e), (f). The Act does not apply when a control share acquisition occurs
pursuant to (1) "a tender offer, merger or plan of consolidation ... to which the issuing public
corporation is a party," id. § 55-90(b)(3)(e), or (2) "the sale of [control] shares by the issuing public
corporation," id. § 55-90(b)(3)(f).
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because it allows management to choose a friendly purchaser, one who is promanagement, and insulates the transaction from the Act. Thus, shareholders
are deprived of the power to decide voting rights of the control shares when
management is party to an acquisition. If the Act is intended to protect share56
holders, the friendly offer exemption contradicts that intention.
As the evolution of state takeover statutes occurs, generally each generation
becomes more sophisticated in avoiding the faults of earlier statutes. Generally,
the first generation state takeover statutes provided state officials broad powers
to require disclosure material additional to that required by the Williams Act
and to determine the fairness of a tender offer; they often had an extraterritorial
feature applying not only to corporations incorporated in-state, but also to outof-state corporations; and they often extended the time periods prescribed by the
Williams Act.5 7 Most of these statutes were held unconstitutional as an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce in the United States Supreme Court de58
cision of Edgar v. MITE Corp.
After MITE, a second generation of state takeover statutes were enacted to
avoid the problems of first generation statutes. Some of these state takeover
statutes regulate tender offers either by requiring that all shareholders receive
the same price for their shares or by giving shareholders the power to approve
the acquisition of their shares or other acquisitions.5 9 These types of takeover
models "often [have] a direct impact on the acquisition of shares in a corporation through a tender offer." 6 Another type of state takeover statute differs
61
from other statutes because it does not directly affect the acquisition of stock.
Instead, it allows tender offers to occur, "but severely limit[s] the offeror's rights
'62
in the corporation."
In April 1987 the United States Supreme Court upheld the validity of Indiana's Control Share Acquisitions Chapter 63 in CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of
America."r The Indiana Act is patterned after the third type of state takeover
statute mentioned above and is characterized as a voting rights statute with a
share redemption feature, similar to the North Carolina Control Share Acquisi65
tion Act.
On March 5, 1986, Indiana enacted its Control Share Acquisitions Chap56. See infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
57. Pinto, supra note 12 at 474; see supra note 5.
58. MITE, 457 U.S. 624 (1982); see also Sargent, supra note 23, at 692-93 (discussing history of
takeover statute cases up to MITE).
59. Pinto, supra note 12, at 474, 478-81.
60. Pinto, supra note 12, at 474; see Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulation:
MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 Bus. LAw. 671 (1985); Sargent, Do the Second-GenerationState Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce Clause?, 8 CoRP. L. REv. 3 (1985).
61. Pinto, supra note 12, at 474.
62. Pinto, supra note 12, at 481-82.
63. Indiana Control Share Acquisitions Chapter, Pub. L. No. 149-1986, § 26, 1986 Ind. Acts
1453 (codified at IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (Burns Supp. 1987)).
64. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
65. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (Bums Supp. 1987); accord N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 55-90 to -98.1 (Com. Supp. 1987).
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ter.66 A week later, Dynamics Corporation of America (Dynamics) announced

a tender offer for a million shares of common stock in CTS Corporation (CTS),
an Indiana corporation. 67 The acquisition would have increased Dynamics'

ownership interest in CTS from less than ten percent to more than twenty-seven
percent.6 8 On March 27, 1986, the board of directors of CTS opted
into the
69
Indiana Act, thereby subjecting Dynamics' tender offer to the Act.
Dynamics brought suit alleging that the Indiana Act was preempted by the
federal Williams Act70 and that the Act violated the commerce clause of the

United States Constitution. 7 1 The district court ruled in favor of Dynamics on
both issues 72 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
a lrmed. 73 The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. 74 In a two-part analysis, the Court held that the Indiana Control Share

Acquisitions Chapter was not preempted by the Williams Act 75 and that the
76
Indiana Act did not violate the commerce clause.

The Supreme Court, using the standard Williams Act preemption analysis,
focused on whether the Indiana statute acted as an obstacle to effectuate the
purpose of the Williams Act.7 7 The CTS Court recognized that the primary

purpose of the Williams Act was to protect shareholders from the coercive nature of some tender offers. 78 By allowing shareholders to decide as a group on
the voting rights of control shares, 79 the Indiana Act was regarded as furthering
a basic purpose of the Williams Act, which was to "place investors on an equal
footing with the takeover bidder." 80
66. Indiana Control Share Acquisitions Chapter, Pub. L. 149-1986, § 26, 1986 Ind. Acts 1453
(codified at IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (Burns Supp. 1987)).
67. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1642.
68. Id. Pursuant to the Indiana Act, Dynamics' acquisition would be considered a control
share acquisition that broke the 20% threshold. The Indiana Act established three threshold requirements of 20%, 33.3% and 50%, identical to the North Carolina Act. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-142-1 (Burns Supp. 1987); accord N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90(b)(2) (Cur. Supp. 1987); see supra note
14 and accompanying text.
69. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1642; see IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-17-3(b) (Burns Supp. 1987) (providing
an opt-in provision for Indiana corporations existing before statute enacted); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5598.1 (Cum.Supp. 1987) (similar opt-in provision).
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
71. The commerce clause provides, "The Congress shall have Power ...to regulate Commerce
...among the several States...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
72. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 794 F.2d 250
(7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S.Ct. 1637 (1987).
73. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S.Ct.
1637 (1987).
74. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1652.
75. Id. at 1648.
76. Id. at 1652.
77. Id. at 1644. The Williams Act would preempt the Indiana Act only if (1) Congress explicitly indicated an intent in the Williams Act to preempt state law, or (2) compliance with both the
Williams Act and the Indiana Statute was a physical impossibility, or (3) the Indiana Act frustrated
the purpose of the Williams Act. The first and second factors were summarily dismissed by the
Court as not applicable to the Indiana Act. Id; see Sargent, supra note 23, at 703-04 (setting out
standard sequence of Williams Act preemption analysis).
78. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1645-46; see supra notes 5, 24 and text accompanying note 34.
79. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-7 (Burns Supp. 1987).
80. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1645-46 (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 30 (1977)); see
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In passing the Williams Act, Congress also recognized that shareholder
protection included preserving the neutrality between offeror and management.
Congress was careful to avoid "tipping the balance of regulation either in favor
of management or in favor of the [offeror]." 8 1 The CTS Court reasoned that the
Indiana Act did not upset the balance of power between the two contending
parties (offeror and management) in a tender offer.8 2 Contrary to the Illinois
Business Take-Over Act, which was struck down in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,s 3 the
Indiana Act maintained this balance: (1) it allowed both offeror and management to communicate with shareholders, 8 4 (2) it did not allow the state government to impose its views of fairness on the transaction," and (3) the Act's
maximum fifty-day period in which management was to hold a shareholder
meeting to determine voting rights of control shares did not impose an indefinite
or unreasonable delay on tender offers. 86 Thus, the Williams Act did not pre87
empt the Indiana Act.

The second part of the CTS analysis addressed whether the Indiana Act
violated the commerce clause of the United States Constitution by interfering
with the power of Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce . . .among the several
States ....
,"88 "[A]t least since Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1852),
Senate Report accompanying the Williams Act, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967). But
see CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1654-55 (White, J.,
dissenting) (arguing majority erroneously equates protection of individual investors, the focus of the Williams Act, with protection of shareholders as a
group; the Indiana Act protects majority shareholders but can prevent minority shareholders from
selling stock at a premium).
81. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2811, 2813.
82. CT'S, 107 S. Ct. at 1645-48. The Court analyzed the Indiana Act in light of this purpose of
the Williams Act even though it called this a broad interpretation of the Williams Act. Id.; see
Sargent, supra note 23, at 713-19 (discussing two alternate views of the purpose of the Williams
Act--solely investor protection, or investor protection combined with maintaining balance of power
between offeror and management).
83. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
84. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1646; see IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-8(b) (Burns Supp. 1987); accord
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-93 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
85. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1646; see IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (Burns Supp. 1987) (shareholders
decide whether to allow voting rights, no state government involvement); accord N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-94(b) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
86. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1646; see IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-7(b) (Burns Supp. 1987); accord
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-92(b) (Cur. Supp. 1987) (same 50-day provision). The 50-day provision did
not conflict with the Williams Act's requirement that a tender offer be held open for a minimum
period of 20 business days. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1647; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-I (1987). "The [Indiana] Act does not impose an absolute 50-day delay on tender offers, nor does it preclude an offeror
from purchasing shares as soon as federal law permits." CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1647. Even assuming the
Indiana statute imposed some delay, the Court stated that the preemption test hinged on whether the
delay was unreasonable. Id. (relying on plurality in MITE, 457 U.S. at 639). The 50-day delay was
reasonable since it was within the Williams Act's 60-day maximum period established for tender
offers to be held open before shareholders can withdraw their shares. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1647. See
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982); supra note 5; see also Sargent, supra note 23, at 714-19 (discussing
permissible scope of variation between state takeover statute time periods and Williams Act time
periods).
87. Although the CTS Court did not mention it, the Indiana Act further preserved the balance
of powers by prohibiting any interested party from participating in the decision to allow voting
rights to control shares. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9(b) (Burns Supp. 1987); accord N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-94(b) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
88. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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it has been clear that 'the Commerce Clause... even without implementing
legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States.' "89 However, the CTS Court recognized that some state regulations affecting interstate
commerce do not violate the commerce clause, 90 and the Court applied this exception to the Indiana Act.
In its commerce clause analysis, the Court developed a three-part test and
applied it to the Indiana statute.9 1 The first two parts involved a "threshold"
analysis 92 to determine whether the statute discriminated against interstate com93
merce and whether the statute subjected activities to inconsistent regulations.
In the third part, the CTS Court considered whether the burden on interstate
commerce imposed by the statute outweighed the benefits to the State of
94
Indiana.
In the first part of its analysis, the Court noted that if the Indiana statute
discriminated against interstate commerce, it would violate the commerce
clause. 95 The Indiana Act did not discriminate against interstate commerce because the Act treated in-state and out-of-state offerors equally. 96 In the second
part of its analysis, the CTS Court emphasized that the Indiana Act must not
adversely affect interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations.97 The Court found no such violation because the Indiana Act only regulated the voting rights of Indiana corporations, which only Indiana had the right
98
to regulate.
89. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1976) (quoting Freeman
v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946)).
90. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1648; see also Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980)
(states "retain authority.. . to regulate matters of 'legitimate local concern,' even though interstate
commerce may be affected"); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978)
(same); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 140 (1973) (same).
91. Since 1970 courts have traditionally used the balancing test established in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970), to determine whether a statute violates the commerce clause.
The Court in Pike held: "Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Id.
Although the CTS Court did not explicitly refer to the Pike test, the Court incorporated the Pike
factors in its commerce clause analysis. The Pike balancing test is appropriate for the commerce
clause analysis of the extraterritorial feature of the North Carolina Control Share Acquisition Act.
See infra notes 129-71 and accompanying text.
92. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
93. Id. at 1648-49.
94. Id. at 1649-52. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, recognized the Court's application
of the Pike test and criticized the majority for using that aspect of the Pike balancing test that weighs
the burden of the regulation against the benefits to the state. Id. at 1652-53 (Scalia, J., concurring).
95. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1648; see, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36-37
(1980) (using discrimination test); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (same);
accord Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (statute must regulate evenhandedly).
96. CTS, 107 S. Ct.'at 1649. The Act imposed no greater burden on out-of-state offerors than
on similarly situated Indiana offerors. Id. "The fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on
some interstate companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate
commerce." Id. (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978)).
97. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1649; see, eg., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Auth., 106 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (1986) (applying inconsistent regulation test); Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982) (same).
98. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1649. "So long as each State regulates voting rights only in the corporations it has created, each corporation will be subject to the law of only one State." Id.
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Indiana's takeover statute regulated the process of according voting rights

to control shares, an established function of state corporate governance. 99 A key
to the holding was the Court's interpretation that the Indiana Act regulated

state corporate governance, not the transaction of shares in the interstate market.l10 Thus, the Indiana Act avoided a problem faced by earlier takeover statutes that have been invalidated on commerce clause grounds because they
directly regulated the transfer of shares in the interstate market. 10 1
In the third part of its commerce clause analysis, the CTS Court balanced

the burden on interstate commerce imposed by the statute against the benefit to
the State.10 2 Once the CTS Court defined the Indiana Act as regulating share-

holder voting rights of Indiana corporations, a form of state corporate governance, it was relatively easy to find that the impact on interstate commerce would

not overcome that strong state interest. 10 3 The Court reasoned that state corporate laws regulating corporate governance have an unavoidable impact on certain aspects of interstate commerce, and that the impact of the Indiana Act was
°4
no different than the impact of other state corporate laws.1

The internal affairs doctrine, a principle of conflict of laws, provided the
basis for the Court's finding that the Indiana Act did not violate the commerce
clause even though it affected out-of-state business and nonresidents.105 The

internal affairs doctrine recognizes that when the organic structure or internal
administration of a corporation is affected, it is essential to the "beneficial free

market system"' 1 6 that only one state's law apply.10 7 Because a corporation is a
99. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1649. "No principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly
established than a State's authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to
define the voting rights of shareholders." Id.; accord Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (statute must "effectuate a
legitimate local public interest"); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 304
(1971).
100. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1649. But see id. at 1655 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing Indiana Act
regulates securities transactions in interstate market and such interference violates commerce
clause); see also Sargent, supra note 23, at 722-27 (describing how treatment of state takeover laws as
an exercise of state corporate law would survive commerce clause analysis, but treatment of state
takeover laws as state securities regulations would fail commerce clause test).
101. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640-41 (1982).
102. See CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1649-52; accord Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (burden must not be excessive
in relation to local benefits). But see CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1652-53 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing
this aspect of the majority's opinion).
103. Although the Indiana Act only applied to Indiana corporations, its effect transcended state
boundaries due to the national nature of corporate business and the existence of out-of-state shareholders in Indiana corporations.
104. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1650. But see id. at 1655 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing Indiana Act
differs from other aspects of state corporate laws because Act is intended to prevent certain tender
offers from ever occurring).
The Court found further support for the validity of the Indiana Act because the Act
only applied to Indiana corporations that had a "substantial number of shareholders in
Indiana. Thus, every application of the Indiana Act will affect a substantial number of
Indiana residents, whom Indiana indisputably has an interest in protecting."
CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1652 (citation omitted); see IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4(3) (Bums Supp. 1987)
(Act requires either 10% resident shareholders, 10% shares owned by residents, or 10,000 resident
shareholders).
105. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1649-51.
106. Id. at 1650.
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 302 comment e, 304 (1971). This
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creature of state law,10 8 usually the law of the state of incorporation applies to a
state's corporation regardless of where it does business. 10 9

As long as residents and nonresidents had equal access to Indiana corporations and its stock, and because the Act avoided the risk of inconsistent regula-

tion by limiting its application to Indiana corporations, the Court gave great
weight to the established right of Indiana to define the characteristics of its cor-

porations and corporate stock, and to protect the shareholders of its corporations. 110 Thus, Indiana's Control Share Acquisitions Chapter was upheld under
the commerce clause analysis in CTS.111
The Indiana General Assembly developed a takeover statute that avoided

the constitutional pitfalls that had plagued earlier statutes. The Williams Act
did not preempt the Indiana Act because the Indiana Act furthered the purpose
of shareholder protection and adequately maintained the balance of power be-

tween offerer and management. Further, the Indiana Act did not violate the
commerce clause. First, the statute regulated evenhandedly because it did not
discriminate between in-state and out-of-state offerors. Second, because the Act
regulated state corporate governance of only Indiana corporations, there was no

risk of inconsistent regulation of shareholder voting rights. Third, Indiana's
strong interest in state corporate governance and shareholder protection, and
the necessity that only one state's laws govern the internal affairs of a corporation was not outweighed by any burden on interstate commerce imposed by the
Indiana statute for commerce clause purposes.
The North Carolina General Assembly, in passing the North Carolina Control Share Acquisition Act had the opportunity to improve upon earlier state
takeover statutes and to rely on the CTS decision upholding the validity of Indiana's takeover statute. In fact, within one month after the CTS decision, the
North Carolina General Assembly enacted the North Carolina Control Share
rationale stems from the necessity that a corporation, its management, and shareholders can make
decisions based on "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, protection of the justified expectations of the parties and ease in the application of the law to be applied." Id. § 302 comment e.
108. An early Supreme Court decision explored the peculiar nature of a corporation:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation
of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter
of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These
are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created.
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819); see also Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) ("Corporations are creatures of state law.").
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 302 comment e, 304 (1971).
110. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1652. The Court was not persuaded by Dynamics' argument that the
Indiana Act was unconstitutional because it would burden interstate commerce by limiting the
number of successful tender offers. The Court stated that, first, there was little evidence such a result
would occurs, and second, that such a result would not affect the Court's commerce clause analysis:
[T]his Act does not prohibit any entity-resident or nonresident-from offering to
purchase, or from purchasing shares in Indiana corporations, or from attempting thereby
to gain control. It only provides regulatory procedures designed for the better protection
of the corporations' shareholders .... Accordingly, even if the Act should decrease the
number of successful tender offers for Indiana corporations, this would not offend the
Commerce Clause.
Id.; see Pinto, supra note 12, at 492-94.
111. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1652.
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Acquisition Act.'
The North Carolina Act follows the Indiana model of a voting rights stat-

ute with a share redemption feature. However, the North Carolina Act deviates
from the Indiana Act in two significant ways that subjects the North Carolina

Act to constitutional attacks. First, the North Carolina Act contains a "friendly
offer exemption" not found in the Indiana Act.'

13

Such a provision is subject to

a Williams Act preemption analysis. Second, the two Acts differ in their application to foreign corporations: the North Carolina Act applies to in-state and

out-of-state corporations, whereas the Indiana Act applies only to Indiana corporations. 114 This extraterritorial application to foreign corporations is susceptible to a commerce clause attack. After the CTS decision, the major
constitutional questions regarding the North Carolina Act are the validity of its
friendly offer exemption provision and its extraterritorial reach.
Like the Indiana Act, the North Carolina Act furthers the Williams Act's
purpose of shareholder protection by requiring approval by a majority of disin-

terested shareholders before voting rights are accorded control shares.'

15

Also

like the Indiana Act, the North Carolina Act does not upset the balance of

power between offeror and management insofar as it (1) allows each to communicate with shareholders, (2) does not allow the State to impose its views on the

fairness of the transaction, (3) does not impose an indefinite or unreasonable
delay on a tender offer, and (4) does not allow an interested party to participate

in the decision to accord voting rights to control shares.

16

However, it is questionable whether the Act's friendly offer exemption, a
provision not found in the Indiana Act,' 17 furthers the purpose of the Williams

Act. The friendly offer provision of the North Carolina Act exempts any management approved control share acquisition. 188 Thus, shareholders have no input when management is party to a control share acquisition. Various courts

and commentators have maintained that such a provision is pro-management,
discriminatory and unconstitutional because it violates the purpose of the Williams Act to protect shareholders while preserving a balance of power between

offeror and management.

19

For example, in National City Lines Inc. v. LLC

112. North Carolina Control Share Acquisition Act, ch. 182, 1987 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 48
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-90 to -98 (Cum. Supp. 1987)), ch. 773, § 12, 1987 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 426 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-98.1 (Cum. Supp. 1987)).
113. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90(b)(3)(e)-(f) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
114. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90(b)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1987) (Act applies to certain foreign
corporations doing business in North Carolina) with IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-4, 23-1-20-5
(Bums Supp. 1987) (Act only applies to Indiana corporations). See supra text accompanying note
16.
115. See CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1645-46; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-94 (Cum. Supp. 1987); accordIND.
CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (Burns Supp. 1987).
116. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
117. The Indiana Act does exempt control share acquisitions made pursuant to a merger or plan
of share exchange if management is a party to the acquisition; however, such mergers or share
exchanges are contingent upon shareholder approval. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-2(d)(5); -140 (Burns Supp. 1987).
118. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-90(b)(3)(e)-(f) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
119. See, eg., National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1133 (8th Cir. 1982);
Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1278 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on othergrounds
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Corp.,120 the court held that the friendly offer provision of the Missouri Takeover Bid Disclosure Act, along with other provisions of the Act, was discriminatory and "disrupt[ed] the neutrality essential to the proper operation of the
market approach of protecting investors utilized by the Williams Act. ' 121
Another problem with a friendly offer exemption provision is that it does
not promote the purpose of the Williams Act of protecting investors by giving
them the power to accept or reject a tender offer after full disclosure.1 22 Instead
it reserves that power in management and it is not clear that management will
always vigorously promote shareholder interests in a tender offer situation. 123
Facing a hostile tender offer that could be financially beneficial to shareholders
but harmful to incumbent management regarding employment, management
could approve a friendly control share acquisition to thwart the takeover attempt and preserve its jobs, to the detriment of shareholders and offeror. Thus,
the North Carolina Act's friendly offer exemption is subject to a Williams Act
preemption attack because it upsets the neutrality between contending parties by
giving incumbent management more power to fight off an offeror's takeover attempt without regard to shareholder protection.
Applying the commerce clause analysis used in CTS, the North Carolina
Act must first meet the two-part "threshold" analysis by not discriminating
against interstate commerce and by not subjecting the process of determining
voting rights of control shares to inconsistent regulation.1 24 Under the third
part of the analysis, the burden on interstate commerce must not be excessive in
125
relation to the local benefits to North Carolina.
Like the Indiana Act, the North Carolina Act does not discriminate against
interstate commerce because it makes no distinction between in-state and out-ofstate investors seeking a control share acquisition.126 The next issue is whether
the North Carolina Act subjects activities to inconsistent regulations. That part
of the Act which applies only to North Carolina corporations will not violate the
commerce clause. 127 The lingering and more difficult question relates to the
1 28
extraterritorial reach of the Act.
Extraterritorial features, common among first generation takeover statutes,
contributed to the Supreme Court's finding that such provisions are unconstitusub nom. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp.
1400, 1417, 1420 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Sargent, supra note 23, at 698, 716-19; Sommer, The Ohio Takeover Act: What Is It?, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681, 694 (1970).
120. 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982).
121. Id. at 1132-33.
122. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1278-79.
123. Sommer, supra note 119, at 694. But see Sargent, supra note 23, at 718-19 (pointing out
that the fiduciary duty by management to shareholders may deter management from abusing its
discretion in taking defensive measures to hostile takeover attempts).
124. See C7Y, 107 S.Ct. at 1648-49; supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
125. See CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1649-52; supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
126. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1987) (Act makes no reference to resi-

dence of acquiror, but is only concerned with the amount of shares acquired); supra notes 95-96 and
accompanying text.
127. See CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1649.

128. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90(b)(5)(a)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
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tional under a commerce clause analysis. 129 To be valid, the extraterritorial fea-

ture of the North Carolina Act must not violate the commerce clause under the

13 1
test set out in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 130 and implicitly utilized in CTS.

Finally, if the extraterritorial provision does not subject the determination of
control share voting rights to inconsistent regulation, it will be valid if it effectu-

ates a legitimate local interest and the burden
on interstate commerce is not
132 "
excessive in relation to the state benefit.

A critical issue for the commerce clause analysis is whether the internal
affairs doctrine, relied on in CTS,1 33 establishes a legitimate local interest for the

North Carolina Act to reach foreign corporations. The proposition that the internal affairs doctrine establishes a legitimate local interest in North Carolina
has little or no application to foreign corporations covered by the North Carolina Act. The internal affairs doctrine states that when the organic structure or

internal administration of a corporation is at issue, only one state's law governs.13 4 Usually, the applicable law is that of the state of incorporation.1 35 The

inapplicability of the internal affairs doctrine to foreign corporations in North
Carolina is damaging to the extraterritorial analysis because the internal affairs
doctrine provided a foundational principle in the CTS analysis to assure the

Court that the Indiana Act would not subject 136
corporate governance of share-

holder voting rights to inconsistent regulation.
However, an exception to the rule that the laws of the incorporating state
should govern the internal affairs of its corporations has been recognized when a

corporation is considered a psuedo-foreign corporation. A pseudo-foreign corporation is characterized as being incorporated in one state but conducting most,

if not all, of its business and having its principal place of business in another
state, called the host state. 137 In this situation, the legislative jurisdiction of the

host state can regulate the internal affairs of pseudo-foreign corporations when
there is a strong host state interest and no applicable laws of the incorporating
138
state exist.
129. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982).
130. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see supra note 91.
131. See supra note 91.
132. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
133. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 302 comment e, 304 (1971); see supra
notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 302 comment e, 304 (1971); see supra
notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
136. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
137. See Kaplan, Foreign CorporationsandLocal CorporatePolicy, 21 VAND. L. REv., 433, 43739 (1968).
138. See Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965); Gaillard v. Field, 381 F.2d 25 (10th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968); Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d
317 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959); Belk v. Belk's Dep't Store of Columbia, S.C., Inc.,
250 N.C. 99, 108 S.E.2d 131 (1959).
For a general discussion of the psuedo-foreign corporation analysis, see Kaplan, supra note 137;
Latty, Pseudo-ForeignCorporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955); Note, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations
and the "InternalAffairs" Rule, 1960 DuKE L.J. 477; Sargent, supra note 23, at 724-27; Shipman,
supra note 51, at 752, 755.
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The North Carolina Act acknowledges the pseudo-foreign exception to the
internal affairs doctrine in two provisions. Regarding resident corporations, the
application of the Act is limited to those North Carolina corporations that have
"substantial assets" within the State. 139 Concerning foreign corporations coming under the scope of the Act, the Act's comity provision exempts a foreign
corporation when the laws of the state of its incorporation are "expressly inconsistent" with the North Carolina Act. 14
However, the North Carolina Act's aggressive extraterritorial reach encompasses more than pseudo-foreign corporations. For example, the Act applies to
a foreign corporation with forty percent of its fixed United States assets located
in North Carolina and its principal place of business or principal office in North
Carolina. 141 This more lenient standard contradicts the purpose of the internal
affairs doctrine by inviting uncertainty, unpredictability, and conflicting results
in deciding what law applies to certain foreign corporations doing business in
North Carolina. 142
For example, assume State X has not enacted a Control Share Acquisition
Act and State Y has enacted such an Act which is different from North Carolina's, but which also has a similar extraterritorial feature. A conflict between
State X, State Y, and North Carolina would arise in a control share acquisition
of stock when a target corporation is incorporated and has ten percent of its
domestic assets in State X, fifty percent of its domestic assets in State Y, and
forty percent of its domestic assets, forty percent of its employees, ten percent of
its shareholders or shares, and principal office in North Carolina. In this scenario, all three states might have a claim that their corporate law applies. 143 The
extraterritorial feature of the North Carolina Act creates a potential for subjecting the determination of voting rights of a foreign corporation's shares to inconsistent regulations, thereby violating the commerce clause. 144
In the absence of the internal affairs doctrine, and assuming the doctrine
does not invalidate the extraterritorial reach of the North Carolina Act, a legitimate local interest to support the extraterritorial feature of the Act still must be
found to satisfy the commerce clause analysis. In addition to the internal affairs
doctrine, two other state interests have been advanced to support state takeover
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90(b)(5)(a)(i) (Cum. Supp. 1987). "Substantial assets" is not defined
in the Act.
140. Id. § 55-96; see supra notes 21-22.
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90(b)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 302 comment e, 304 comment c
(1971); supra note 107 and accompanying text.
143. A more extreme problem with the Act's reach would occur if a foreign corporation had
60% of its assets in its state of incorporation and the remaining 40% in North Carolina, and the
other requirements of the North Carolina Act were met concerning employees, shareholders and
principal place of business. In this situation, in the absence of conflicting state laws, the North
Carolina Act requires North Carolina law to apply to a control share acquisition even though a
majority of the foreign corporation's assets are located in its state of incorporation. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-90(b)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1987).

144. See CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
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statutes: shareholder protection and protection of the local economy 45
The North Carolina Act is designed to protect shareholders from coercive
tender offers by allowing shareholders to decide voting rights of control shares,
and by providing a redemption provision that allows shareholders to obtain a
fair value for their stock. 146 A state has an indisputable interest in protecting
resident shareholders. 147 Furthermore, under the internal affairs doctrine, a
state also has the obligation to protect nonresident shareholders of its state corporations. 14 8 Thus, shareholder protection does establish a legitimate local interest. However, a state has "no interest in protecting nonresident shareholders
of nonresident corporations."149 Therefore, regarding the extraterritorial reach
of the North Carolina Act, the constitutional issue arises whether the burden of
protecting resident 9hareholders of foreign corporations doing business in North
Carolina is excessive in relation to its local benefits. 150
The problem with the extraterritorial feature of the North Carolina Act is
that it applies not only to North Carolina shareholders of foreign corporations,
but also to nonresident shareholders. The Act applies to a foreign corporation
that has "[m]ore than ten percent (10%) of its shareholders resident in North
Carolina; or [m]ore than ten percent (10%) of its shares owned by North Carolina residents." 15 1 Contrary to state blue-sky laws, which have withstood commerce clause challenges because they regulate only intrastate securities
transactions involving resident shareholders, 152 the North Carolina Act applies
15 3
when ninety percent of a foreign corporation's shareholders are nonresident.
When weighing the burden on interstate commerce against the local benefit
of resident shareholder protection, a problem exists with a state takeover statute
that applies to a foreign corporation with a high percentage of nonresident
shareholders. "[T]o the extent the [takeover statute] burdens interstate commerce there are no 'local benefits' that arise from the statute's application to
nonresident shareholders."' 1 4 Thus, the North Carolina Act's application to
foreign corporations when up to ninety percent of shareholders or shares are
out-of-state is problematic when weighing the burden on all shareholders against
the benefit of protecting only ten percent of that total.
The Indiana Act analyzed in CTS had resident shareholder requirements
145. See Pinto, supra note 12, at 488; Comment, The North Carolina Tender Offer Disclosure
Act: CongenitallyDefective?, 14 WAKE FOREsr L. REv. 1035, 1054-60 (1978).
146. See supra notes 25-26, 32-34 and accompanying text.
147. See CTS, 107 S.CL at 1652; Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982).
148. Sargent, supra note 23, at 724.
149. CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1651.
150. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
151. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90(b)(5)(d) (Cur. Supp. 1987).
152. See, eg., Travelers' Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Merrick v. Halsey & Co.,
242 U.S. 568 (1917); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1917); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F.
Supp. 1400, 1415 (W.D. Mo. 1985); State ex rel. Smith v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 191 N.C. 643, 132

S.E. 792 (1926).
153. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90(b)(5)(d) (Cur. Supp. 1987).
154. APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216, 1222 (D. Minn. 1985)
(citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 623, 644 (1982)).
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similar to the North Carolina Act.15 5 However, unlike the North Carolina Act,
the Indiana Act only applied to resident corporations.1 56 The limited application to Indiana corporations was critical to the CTS Court both in terms of its
internal affairs analysis and its shareholder protection argument. In addition, the
Court treated the Indiana Act's protection of Indiana shareholders as supplemental to the core internal affairs analysis. 157 There is no indication in the CTS
decision that solely a ten percent resident shareholder requirement would be
sufficient to establish a legitimate local interest for a commerce clause analysis in
the absence of the internal affairs argument.
Further, the Pike balancing test states that when balancing the burden
against the local benefit, it is appropriate to consider whether the local interest
could be protected with a "lesser impact on interstate activities." '1 58 The protection of North Carolina shareholders in foreign corporations could be accomplished with less of a burden on nonresident shareholders by increasing the
required resident shareholder percentage or by limiting the Act's application
159
only to resident shareholders.
The second goal of the North Carolina Act that might serve as a legitimate
state interest to justify the Act's extraterritorial facet is the protection of North
Carolina's economy from the disruptive aspects of a corporate takeover or control share acquisition. A state clearly has an interest in enacting laws that enhance its business climate.1 6 However, at least one court has held that it "has
the constitutional duty to determine whether State-desired benefits can, in fact,
result from [a Control Share Acquisition Act] and only those [benefits] which
are not 'speculative' may be placed in the scale to be balanced against the burden
on interstate commerce." 1 61 When protection of the local economy is proposed
as the state interest effectuated, courts have required a sufficient link between
1 62
that interest and the effect of the statute.
155. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4 (Bums Supp. 1987) (requiring either 10% resident shareholders, 10% shares owned by residents, or 10,000 resident shareholders).

156. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1651. This distinction is significant in light of the CTS Court's statement, "We agree that Indiana has no interest in protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident
corporations. But [the Indiana] Act applies only to corporations incorporated in Indiana." Id.
157. Id. at 1651-52. One commentator questioned the relevancy of a resident shareholder

requirement.
Query .

.

. whether the requirement of some fixed amount of stockholding in the state

makes any sense. From a practical standpoint, the use of street names and nominee accounts makes the ascertainment of beneficial stock ownership difficult. From a theoretical
standpoint, in-state stock ownership may be irrelevant. That is, if state takeover laws are a
form of traditional state corporate law, their protections should and can extend to all
stockholders wherever located.
Sargent, supra note 23, at 725 n.220 (citation omitted).
158. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); accord Van Dusen, 622 F. Supp. at
1222.
159. For example, Minnesota's Take-Over Act, held valid against a commerce clause attack,
limited its application to takeovers if 20% of the shareholders were Minnesota residents and, more

importantly, any suspension of a tender offer applied only to Minnesota resident shareholders. In
this way, the statute was narrowly applied to protect Minnesota shareholders only, and did not affect

nonresident shareholders. Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 911 (8th Cir. 1984).
160. APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216, 1223 (D. Minn. 1985).
161. Id. at 1221; accord Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982).
162. See Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1286 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on
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State takeover statutes generally have not created a sufficient nexus between
their purpose and the state interest in protecting the local economy. Litigants
have attacked the "protection of the local economy" rationale on various
grounds. First, courts have not been willing to find that a takeover or control
share acquisition will necessarily harm the local economy. 163 Second, the justification for burdening interstate commerce by interfering with a tender offer is
undermined when, for example, a takeover statute places no future requirements
on incumbent or new management to protect the local economy by keeping the
corporation in-state, keeping employment at a certain level, or restricting a corporation from leaving the state. 164 The North Carolina Act imposes no such
restrictions and it is questionable whether such measures would be valid under
165
the commerce clause.
Third, the existence of the friendly offer provision in the North Carolina
Act weakens the argument that the statute protects the local economy. A
friendly offer provision exempts from the statute any management-approved acquisition. 166 Such an exception does not necessarily protect the local economy
because the exception exists without regard to the effect that a friendly acquisition would have on a state's economic interests. 167 The existence of a friendly
offer exemption which removes the decisionmaking power from shareholders
has also been criticized as undermining the argument that a takeover statute
168
protects shareholders.
Fourth, the disclosure provision of the North Carolina Act does not require
the acquiring person to reveal his future plans for the corporation in his acquiring person statement. 169 In the absence of this information, shareholders deciding whether to accord voting rights to control shares are less able to determine
the impact of the acquisition on the local economy.
Fifth, the North Carolina Act is triggered when only ten percent of the
shares or shareholders reside in the State. 170 It is tenuous to presume that the
Act effectively protects the local economy if only ten percent of the shareholders
determining voting rights of control shares have an interest in the local economy. The ninety percent nonresident shareholders will have no loyalty to the
other grounds sub nom. Leory v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Van Dusen, 622
F. Supp. at 1223; Icahn v. Blunt 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1417 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
163. See, eg., MITE, 457 U.S. at 633; Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1286.; Van Dusen, 622 F. Supp. at
1223.

164. See Van Dusen, 622 F. Supp. at 1223; Icahn, 612 F. Supp. at 1417.
165. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1949) (state's refusal to
license additional milk receiving facility in order to limit purchases of out-of-state milk violates
commerce clause); Boehm, supra note 23, at 744.
166. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90(b)(3)(e)-(f) (Cur. Supp. 1987).
167. Icahn, 612 F. Supp. at 1417.
168. Edgar v. MITE Corp, 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982); see supra notes 117-23 and accompanying
text.
169. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-91 (CUM. Supp. 1987); see supranotes 28-30 and accompanying text.

This factor is important only when a transaction falls within the scope of the North Carolina Act but
outside the scope of the Williams Act, because the Williams Act requires disclosure of future plans
in a takeover. See supra notes 5, 16.
170. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90(b)(5)(d).

1144

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

moreover, it is not clear that in-state
State and will vote based on economics;
17 1
shareholders would not do the same.

In summary, to the extent that the extraterritorial reach of the North Carolina Control Share Acquisition Act encompasses more than pseudo-foreign corporations, it is not valid under the commerce clause analysis. First, the internal
affairs doctrine-an essential element of the CTS decision upholding the validity
of the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Chapter-will not support the extraterritorial feature of the North Carolina Act. Because the extraterritorial reach
of the Act in some circumstances will subject corporations to inconsistent regulations, it will likely violate the commerce clause of the Constitution.
Second, the shareholder protection rationale establishes a legitimate local
interest; however, the Act's overreaching application to foreign shareholders,
who could account for ninety percent of a corporation's shareholders, causes a
burden that is excessive in relation to its benefits. Third, the protection of the
local economy rationale establishes only a weak local interest, especially because
the North Carolina Act does not effectively promote this purpose.
To conclude, the North Carolina General Assembly, in passing a more
agressive Control Share Acquisition Act than the Indiana Act upheld in CTS,
has exposed the North Carolina Act to constitutional attack. The Act's friendly
offer exemption provision contradicts the purpose of the Williams Act, and the
Act's extraterritorial reach fails the commerce clause analysis. However, this
does not sound the death knell for the North Carolina Control Share Acquisition Act. With the Court's decision in CTS validating the Indiana Control
Share Acquisitions Chapter, the North Carolina General Assembly can be confident that its Act is also valid to the extent it follows the Indiana Act.' 72 The
flaw of the friendly offer exemption can be corrected in one of two ways. First,
the provision can be omitted altogether. Second, the provision can be amended
to require some shareholder participation in a management approved control
share acquisition as found in the Indiana Act.
The problems raised by the extraterritorial reach of the North Carolina Act
can also be corrected in one of two ways. First, the safer and more prudent
approach would be to eliminate the extraterritorial application altogether,
thereby bringing the scope of the North Carolina Act fully within the Indiana
Act upheld in CTS. This would be a responsible approach to takeover legislation that avoids any conflict of laws issues.
Second, a more aggressive approach, and one that that is less likely to succeed against a commerce clause attack, would be to retain an extraterritorial
provision but create a tighter nexus between the foreign corporation and North
Carolina. This could be accomplished by limiting the Act's application to foreign corporations that more resemble pseudo-foreign corporations. Clearly, the
171. See Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1286; APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp.
1216, 1223 n.6 (D. Minn. 1985).
172. The North Carolina Act contains a severability clause, which allows any provision or clause
held invalid to be severed from the Act without affecting the remainder of the Act. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-97 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
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forty percent asset requirement in the North Carolina Act needs to be raised at
least to fifty percent to ensure that North Carolina would have a more significant
economic interest than any other state. 173 Increasing the resident shareholder
requirement and limiting the Act's protections to resident shareholders are two
other possible steps that would attempt to avoid a commerce clause attack. Finally, the interest in protecting of the local economy could be promoted more
effectively by requiring acquirors of control shares to disclose to shareholders
their future plans for the company, and by eliminating the friendly offer provision that exempts a control share acquisition from the Act when management is
a party to the transaction. However, in light of prior case history and the internal affairs rationale, even these measures would not adequately overcome a commerce clause attack against the North Carolina Control Share Acquisition Act.
JAMES G. FARRIS, JR.

173. See Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc., 138 Cal. App. 3d 216, 226-27, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 852, 860 (1982); Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 1.2 Cal. Rptr. 719
(1961); Shipman, supra note 51, at 755. However, this proposal would not necessarily defeat the
internal affairs argument that the foreign corporation's state of incorporation could use to enforce
the application of its own law.

